Abstract A variety of logical frameworks have been developed to study rational agents interacting over time. This paper takes a closer look at one particular interface, between two systems that both address the dynamics of knowledge and information flow. The first is Epistemic Temporal Logic (ETL) which uses linear or branching time models with added epistemic structure induced by agents' different capabilities for observing events. The second framework is Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) that describes interactive processes in terms of epistemic event models which may occur inside modalities of the language. This paper systematically and rigorously relates the DEL framework with the ETL framework. The precise relationship between DEL and ETL is explored via a new representation theorem characterizing the largest class of ETL models corresponding to DEL protocols in terms of notions of Perfect Recall, No Miracles, and Bisimulation Invariance. We then focus on new issues of completeness. One contribution is an axiomatization for the dynamic logic of public announcements constrained by protocols, which has been an open problem for some years, as it does not fit the usual 'reduction axiom' format of DEL. Finally, we provide a number of examples that show how DEL suggests an interesting fine-structure inside ETL.
Introduction
Many logical systems today describe intelligent interacting agents over time. Frameworks include Interpreted Systems (IS, Fagin et al. [22] ), Epistemic Temporal Logic (ETL, Parikh & Ramanujam [37] ), Logics of Agency (STIT, Belnap et al. [6] ), Process Algebra and Game Semantics (Abramsky [1] ). This variety is an asset, as different modeling tools can be fine-tuned to specific applications. But it may also be an obstacle, when barriers between paradigms and schools go up.
This paper takes a closer look at one particular interface, between two systems that both address the dynamics of knowledge and information flow in multi-agent systems. One is IS/ETL (IS and ETL are, from a technical point of view, the same up to model transformations, cf. [35] ), which uses linear or branching time models with added epistemic structure induced by agents' different capabilities for observing events. These models provide a Grand Stage where histories of some process unfold constrained by a protocol, and a matching epistemic temporal language describes what happens. The other framework is Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL, [5, 20, 25] ) that describes interactive processes in terms of epistemic event models which may occur inside modalities of the language. Temporal evolution is then computed from some initial epistemic model through a process of successive 'product updates'. It has long been unclear how to best compare IS/ETL and DEL. Various aspects have been investigated in [15, 17, 23] , but in this paper, we study the interface in a more systematic way.
Often, DEL and ETL are presented as alternative ways of adding dynamics to multi-agent epistemic models. In this paper, we rather focus on how merging the two different modeling choices leads to interesting new questions. Our leading interest here will be a view of informational processes as evolving over time.
To see what we mean, consider the simplest version of DEL, viz. the logic of public announcements PAL [38] which adds a very specific type of communicative action to epistemic models: a public announcement. Formulas of the form P ϕ are intended to mean "after a public announcement of P, ϕ is true". The ' P ' is interpreted as a restriction of the current model to the states satisfying P. Now, in many real interactions between agents, protocol or social convention dictates that some announcements that can happen may not be allowed. For example, in a conversation, it is typically not polite to "blurt everything out at the beginning", as we must speak in small chunks. Other natural protocol rules include "do not repeat yourself", "let others speak in turn", "be honest", and so on. Imposing these rules restricts the legitimate sequences of possible announcements, and this immediately affects the standard validities of PAL. For instance, consider the PAL-validity stating that the effect of two consecutive announcements, expressed in P Q ϕ, is the same as the effect of one single 'two-in-one' announcement: (P ∧ P Q) ϕ. This equivalence will no longer hold in general protocol-based models, as will be discussed in more detail in Section 4. Other examples of protocols occur in puzzles (the ever-present muddy children are only allowed to make epistemic assertions), while interaction with a database, or some physical measuring device, involves only factual assertions.
In a sense then, this paper is about 'logics of conversation' as governed by protocols. But our results apply much more generally to any sort of informational process, whether linguistically encoded or not. In particular, we want to emphasize another, equally valid interpretation at the outset, which applies to all our notions and results. PAL may also be viewed as a logic of general observation [9, 16] , without any linguistic communication at all. And then, the protocol setting describes knowledge growth in various learning scenarios, moving closer to formalizing part of the temporal logic of formal learning theory (cf. [31] ).
We have two main objectives in this paper. The first is to systematically relate the DEL framework with the ETL framework. The key idea is that repeatedly applying product update with sequences of event models creates an ETL model (details are given in the next section). In other words, given an initial epistemic model and sequences of DEL event models we can generate an ETL model, and thus transform the DEL dynamic modalities into ETL (labeled) temporal modalities. This provides a concrete way of relating DEL and ETL, but it is not the whole story. The precise relationship between DEL and ETL is explored further in Section 3. We prove a new representation theorem characterizing the largest class of ETL models corresponding to DEL protocols in terms of notions of Perfect Recall, No Miracles, and Bisimulation Invariance. These describe the sort of idealized agent presupposed in standard DEL.
Our second objective is to show how ETL and DEL lead to interesting new issues when merged as accounts of intelligent interacting agents. In particular, we focus on new issues of completeness. One contribution is an axiomatization for the dynamic logic of public announcements constrained by protocols, which has been an open problem for some years, as it does not fit the usual 'reduction axiom' format of DEL (cf. Section 4.1). More generally, Section 6 provides a number of examples that show how DEL suggests an interesting fine-structure inside ETL.
Preliminaries
This Section provides the formal details of the two frameworks (ETL and DEL) that we investigate in this paper. We only give the bare necessities needed for our results and the reader is referred to the relevant references listed below for more information.
Epistemic Temporal Logic
We start by fixing a finite set of agents A and a (possibly infinite) set of events . A history is a finite sequence of events from . We write * for the set of histories built from elements of . For a history h, we write he for the history h followed by the event e. Given h, h ∈ * , we write h h if h is a prefix of h , and h ≺ e h if h = he for some event e. Definition 1 (ETL Frames) Let be a set of events. A protocol is a set H ⊆ * closed under non-empty prefixes. An ETL frame is a tuple , H, {∼ i } i∈A with H a protocol, and for each i ∈ A , a binary relation ∼ i on 1 H.
An ETL frame describes how knowledge evolves over time in some informational process. The protocol captures the temporal structure, with h such that h ≺ e h representing the point in time after e has happened in h. The relations ∼ i represent the uncertainty of the agents about how the current history has evolved. Thus, h ∼ i h means that from agent i's point of view, the history h looks the same as the history h. Different modal languages describe these structures (see, for example, [22, 28] ), with 'branching' or 'linear' variants. Here we give the bare necessities to facilitate comparisons with DEL (further language extensions are explored in Section 6.1). Let At be a countable set of atomic propositions. The language L ETL is generated by the following grammar:
where i ∈ A , e ∈ and P ∈ At. Boolean connectives (∨, →, ↔) and dual modal operators ( i , [e]) are defined as usual. The pure epistemic language, 
It is often natural to extend the language L ETL with group knowledge operators (e.g., common or distributed knowledge) and more expressive temporal operators (e.g., arbitrary future or past modalities). This may lead to high complexity of the validity problem (cf. [17, 27] and Section 6.1).
Dynamic Epistemic Logic
An alternative account of interactive dynamics was elaborated by [5, 9, 12, 23] and others. From an initial epistemic model, temporal structure is generated by explicitly triggered by informative events. The epistemic language, L EL , defined above is interpreted at states in an epistemic model as usual: see [18] for details. We only recall the definition of the knowledge operators:
Definition 4 (Epistemic Model) Let
Whereas an ETL frame describes the agents' information at all moments, event models are used to build new epistemic models as needed.
Definition 5 (Event Model, Product Update) An event model E is a tuple S, {−→ i } i∈A , pre , where S is a nonempty set, for each i ∈ A , −→ i ⊆ S × S and pre : S → L EL is the pre-condition function. The set S is called the domain of
The product update M ⊗ E of an epistemic model M = W, {R i } i∈A , V and event model E = S, {−→ i } i∈A , pre is the epistemic model W , R i , V with 1. W = {(w, e) | w ∈ W, e ∈ S and M , w |= pre(e)}, 2. (w, e)R i (w , e ) iff w R i w in M and e −→ i e in E , and
The language L DEL extends L EL with operators E , e for each pair of event models E and event e in the domain of E . Truth for L DEL is defined as usual. We only define the typical DEL modalities: M , w |= E , e ϕ iff M , w |= pre(e) and M ⊗ E , (w, e) |= ϕ (see [4] for more details, and [12] for extended versions of product update allowing factual change).
Remark 1 (Size of the Event Models) Although Definition 5 does not assume that event models are finite, it is often convenient to make such an assumption. The main reason is that the usual reduction axiom for the DEL modality [E , e] (cf. [5] ) contains a conjunction over all elements of E reachable from e. Now if this set is infinite, then the reduction axiom will not be a formula of L DEL since it contains an infinite conjunction.
Example 1 (Public Announcement Logic [24, 38] ) The public announcement of a formula ϕ ∈ L EL is the event model E ϕ = {e}, {−→ i } i∈A , pre where for each i ∈ A , e −→ i e and pre(e) = ϕ. As the reader is invited to verify, the product update of an epistemic model M with a public announcement model E ϕ is the submodel of M containing all the states that satisfy ϕ. In this case, the DEL modality E ϕ , e will be denoted ϕ . Let L PAL denote this language.
Comparing DEL and ETL
Our key observation is that by repeatedly updating an epistemic model with event models, the machinery of DEL in effect creates ETL models. However, note that an ETL model contains not only a description of how the agents' information changes over time, but also "protocol information" describing when each event can be performed. Thus, in rigorously comparing DEL with ETL models, the protocol information must be made explicit, constraining how the relevant conversation, observational set-up, or learning scenario can evolve.
From DEL to ETL
Let E = {(E , e) | E an event model and e ∈ D(E )} be the class of all pointed event models. A DEL protocol is a set P ⊆ E * closed under the initial segment relations (cf. Definition 1). 3 Given a DEL protocol P, let σ denote an element of P (so, σ is a sequence of pointed event models). We write σ n for the initial segment of σ of length n (n ≤ len(σ )) and write σ (n) for the nth component of σ . For example, if σ = (E 1 , e 1 )(E 2 , e 2 )(E 3 , e 3 ) · · · (E n , e n ), then σ 3 = (E 1 , e 1 )(E 2 , e 2 )(E 3 , e 3 ) and σ (3) = (E 3 , e 3 ). Given a sequence σ ∈ E * , we abuse notation and write pre(σ (n) ) for pre(e n ) where σ (n) = (E n , e n ). Furthermore, we write σ (n) −→ i σ (n) provided σ (n) = (E , e) and σ (n) = (E , e ) and e −→ i e in E . Finally, let Ptcl(E) be the class of all DEL protocols, i.e., Ptcl(E) = {P | P ⊆ E * is closed under initial segments}. The main idea is that starting from an initial (pointed) epistemic model we construct an ETL model by repeatedly applying product update. Our most general construction will vary the DEL protocol from state-to-state:
This is a significant generalization of the usual ETL setting where "who can say what and when" is assumed to be common knowledge (cf. [22, 37] ). If a state-dependent protocol p is a constant function (i.e., for all w ∈ D(M ), p(w) = P), we say p is a uniform DEL protocol. To ease exposition, we will denote a uniform DEL protocol by the unique DEL protocol P assigned to each state. Of course, a uniform protocol will be common knowledge among the agents (indeed, the same protocol is used at all states). On the other hand, state-dependent protocols represent situations where the type of conversation, experimental protocol or learning process is not known by any agent. 4 Thus, state-dependent and uniform protocols are two extreme cases with many interesting cases in between where agents have only partial knowledge of the "rules of the situation" they are in. One natural example is the assumption that all agents individually know the protocol:
(so the protocol is uniform in each generated submodel but different generated submodels may be assigned different protocols). For this paper, we will restrict attention to state-dependent and uniform protocols.
We now turn to the main construction of this paper: generating an ETL model from an initial epistemic model and a (state-dependent or uniform) DEL protocol. We start with constructing an ETL model from a uniform DEL protocol since the definition is more transparent. However, we stress that the following two definitions are special cases of the more general construction given below (cf. Definition 9 and Definition 10).
Definition 7 (σ -Generated Epistemic Model) Given an epistemic model M and a finite sequence of event models σ , we define the σ -generated epistemic model,
Definition 8 (ETL Model Generated from a Uniform DEL Protocol) Let M be a pointed epistemic model, and P a DEL protocol. The ETL model generated by M and P, Forest(M , P), represents all possible evolutions of the system obtained by updating M with sequences from P. More precisely,
V is the union of all models of the form M σ with σ ∈ P.
Since any DEL protocol P is closed under prefixes, for any epistemic model M , Forest(M , P) is indeed an ETL model. Here is a concrete illustration:
Example 2 (ETL model generated from a uniform DEL protocol) We illustrate the above construction in public announcement logic (PAL [38] ) with each event model denoting an announcement or observation of some true formula. Let P = {(P), (P, Q), (P, R)} and consider the epistemic model depicted here:
Using Definition 8, we can combine M and P to form an ETL model Forest(M , P):
Note that in this example Forest(M , P), (t) |= R ∧ ¬ R . Thus even though a formula is true, it may not be "announcable" due to the underlying protocol. This reiterates the points raised in the Introduction and will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.1.
The ETL model Forest(M , P) in Example 2 satisfies a strong uniformity condition: if (E , e) is allowable according to the protocol P, then for all histories h, the epistemic action (E , e) can be executed at h iff pre(e) is true at h. This implies that the protocol P is common knowledge. 5 Of course, this condition will not be satisfied in ETL models generated from state-dependent protocols.
, is defined by induction on n:
Definition 10 (Generated ETL Model) Let M = W, {R i } i∈A , V be an epistemic model and p a state-dependent DEL protocol on M . An ETL model Forest(M , p) = H, {∼ i } i∈A , V is defined as follows:
Since each DEL protocol P is closed under prefixes, so is the domain of Forest(M , p). Hence, Definition 10 indeed describes an ETL model. It is not difficult to see that Definition 7 and Definition 8 are special cases of Definition 9 and Definition 10, respectively, when we restrict attention to uniform protocols (the details are left to the reader). We illustrate this construction with another example.
Example 3 (From state-dependent DEL protocols to ETL models) Let M consist of two worlds, w and v which are indistinguishable for agent i (the only one here). Furthermore, let the valuation make P and R true at both worlds and Q true only at w. Let p be a state-dependent DEL protocol defined as follows:
Using Definition 10, we can combine M and p to form Forest(M , p):
where the horizontal lines represent the indistinguishability relation and the dashed lines represent the state-dependent protocol function p. Note that this model does not satisfy the uniformity condition mentioned above. In fact, we
Remark 2 (Public announcement protocols) Restricting to public announcement simplifies many of the definitions in this Section. Since we identify a public announcement event model with a formula (cf. Example 1), a PAL protocol is a set of sequences of formulas of L EL closed under the initial segment relation. More formally, define
When p is a PAL state-dependent PAL protocol, histories in Forest(M , p) are (states followed by) sequences of formula. This leads to simpler versions of Definition 9 and Definition 10. First of all, note that two different sequences of formulas σ and σ both of length n must lead to epistemically disjoint submodels 6 of M n, p . We can use this observation to simplify Definition 9: given an epistemic model
by induction on the length of σ :
We can also simplify Definition 10:
Our subsequent analysis will focus on two classes of structures. Given a class of state-dependent (or uniform) DEL protocols X, let
| M an epistemic model and P ∈ X}, when X is a set of uniform protocols). If X = {p} (respectively X = {P}) then we write
Our first observation is that under mild assumptions we can think of the languages L DEL and L ETL (when based on the same set of events ) as the same formal language. That is, the above model transformation allows use to reinterpret the DEL dynamic modality E , e as a labeled temporal modality. Of course, to recover a DEL modality from an ETL temporal modality e we must know to which event model e belong. The main point is that, since a primitive event e may occur in different event models, a formula of L ETL does 6 That is, we cannot have wσ R n, p i vσ if σ = σ . This is not true for general DEL protocols where agents may not be able to distinguish between different primitive events. not contain enough information to determine which event model different occurrences of the same primitive event e belongs. However, once an ETL model is fixed this information can be extracted (see the proof of Theorem 1). Thus L ETL and L DEL are the same formal language under the mild assumption that it can always be determined which event models different occurrences of the same primitive event belongs.
An easy induction shows that this model transformation preserves truth in the following sense. Let ProtocolDEL be the protocol of all finite sequences of DEL event models and M an epistemic model with w ∈ D(M ) (and hence (w) is a history in Forest(M , ProtocolDEL)):
Proof The proof is by induction on the structure of ϕ. The only interesting case is the (labeled) temporal modality. Suppose ϕ is of the form E , e ψ. The key observation is that for all epistemic models M with w ∈ D(E ) and event
The proof of ( * * ) follows easily from the definitions. Note that the right to left direction uses the fact that ProtocolDEL contains all pointed event models. Using this observation, the proof of the modal case is straightforward:
Proposition 1 explains a common intuition about linking DEL to ETL. But there is more to come! Indeed, varying the parameters in Proposition 1 opens the door to a number of new questions. For example, we can extend the DEL language with temporal operators, or vary the protocol to create new DEL and ETL-style logics: much more on this will be found in Section 4 below.
From ETL to DEL
Not all ETL models can be generated by a DEL protocol. Indeed, such generated ETL models have a number of special properties. In this section we study precisely which properties these are. The main result (Theorem 1) of this section is a characterization of the ETL models that are generated by some (uniform) DEL protocol. This is an improvement of an existing characterization result found in [9] and provides a precise comparison between the DEL and ETL frameworks. We start with the properties identified by van Benthem [9] needed to characterize the ETL models resulting from consecutive updates with one single event model. These properties come from the definition of product update (Definition 5). This property is equivalent over the class of ETL models to the above definition of Perfect Recall and synchronicity. We use the above formulation of Perfect Recall in order to stay closer to the computer science literature on verifying multiagent systems (cf. [22] ) and the game theory literature (cf. [19] ).
Note that Definition 11 are properties of ETL frames. Already with these properties we can say something about how to relate the two frameworks. Suppose that H is an ETL frame satisfying the properties in Definition 11. We can easily read off an epistemic frame (i.e., a set of states W and relations R i for each agent i ∈ A on W) to serve as the initial model (let the histories of length 1 be the states and simply copy the uncertainty relations). Furthermore, we can define a "DEL-like" protocol P H (the construction is given below in the proof of Theorem 1) consisting of sequences of event models where the precondition function assigns to the primitive events sets of finite histories. Intuitively, if e is a primitive event (i.e., a state in an event model), then pre(e) is the set of histories where e can "be performed". Thus, we have a comparison of the two frameworks at the level of frames provided we work with a modified definition of an event model. However, our main theorem is stated in terms of models, so we need additional properties. In particular, at each level of the ETL model we will need to specify a formula of L EL as a pre-condition for each primitive event e (cf. Definition 5). As usual, this requires that the set of histories preceding an event e be bisimulation-closed:
(prop) h and h satisfy the same propositional formulas, (forth) for every g ∈ H, if h ∼ i g then there exists g ∈ H with h ∼ i g and gZ g (back) for every g ∈ H , if h ∼ i g then there exists g ∈ H with h ∼ i g and gZ g .
If Z is an epistemic bisimulation and hZ h then we say h and h are epistemically bisimilar. An ETL model H satisfies epistemic bisimulation invariance iff for all epistemically bisimilar histories h, h ∈ H, if he ∈ H then h e ∈ H.
However, as is well-known, bisimulation-invariance alone is typically not enough to guarantee the existence of such a formula. More specifically, there are examples of infinite sets that are bisimulation closed but not definable by any formula of L EL (however, it will be definable by a formula of epistemic logic with infinitary conjunctions-see [18] for a discussion). Thus, if the set of histories at some level in which an event e can be executed is infinite, there may not be a formula of L EL that defines this set to be used as a pre-condition for e. Such a formula will exist under an appropriate finiteness assumption: at each level there are only finitely many histories in which e can be executed, 7 i.e., for each n, the set {h | he ∈ H and len(h) = n} is finite. Note that both no miracles and bisimulation invariance are "global properties". It turns out that we only need "local" versions of these properties: 
) -Local Bisimulation Invariance iff for all h, h ∈ H, if h ∼
* h and h and h are epistemically bisimilar, and he ∈ H, then h e ∈ H One final assumption is needed since we are assuming that product update does not change the ground facts. An ETL model H satisfies propositional stability provided for all histories h in H , events e with he in H and all propositional variables P, if P is true at h then P is true at he. We remark that this property is not crucial for the results in this section and can be dropped provided we allow product update to change the ground facts (cf. [12] 
for some initial epistemic model M and DEL protocol P. We show that H satisfies local bisimulation invariance, and leave it to the reader to check that H satisfies the remaining properties. Suppose that h, h ∈ H with h ∼ * h , h and h are epistemically bisimilar, and he ∈ H for some event e ∈ (= D(P)). We must show h e ∈ H. By con-
and e ∈ D(E ). In order to prove h e ∈ H, it is enough to show h e ∈ D(M ⊗ E 1 ⊗ · · · E n ⊗ E ). This follows from two facts: (2) h |= pre(e). (2) follows from the fact that h and h are epistemically bisimilar and pre(e) is assumed to be a formula of L EL .
(1) follows from the assumption that h ∼ * h . Suppose H = , H, {∼ i } i∈A , V is an ETL model satisfying the above properties. We must show there is an epistemic model M H and a DEL protocol P H such that H = Forest(M H , P H ). For the initial epistemic model, let
Call a history h ∈ H maximal if there is no h ∈ H such that h ≺ h . Now, for each maximal history h ∈ H, define the closure of h, denoted C(h), to be the smallest set that contains all finite prefixes of h, and if h ∈ C(h) and h ∼ * h , then also h ∈ C(h). Note that by perfect recall, C(h) is closed under finite prefixes and is completely connected with respect to the ∼ * relation. It is easy to see that According to Definition 1, H only contains finite histories. This restriction is not crucial, however, and our result remains true without it. H = {C(h) | h is a maximal history}.
We define, for each maximal history h ∈ H and j = 1, . . . , len(h), an event model E h j = S h j , {−→ i } i∈A , pre as follows:
1. S h j = {e ∈ | there is a history h of length j in H with h = h · e}. 2. For each e, e ∈ S h j , define e −→ i e provided there are histories h and h of length j ending in e and e respectively, such that h ∼ i h . 3. For each e ∈ S h j , let pre(e) be the formula that characterizes the set {h | he ∈ H and len(h) = j}. Such a formula does exist, due to local bisimulation invariance and the finiteness assumption.
Finally, let P H = {(E )
h j | h is a maximal history in H and j ≤ len(h)}. Clearly, P H is a DEL protocol and so is an element of X uni DEL . It is easy to see that Forest(M H , P H ) and H have the same set of histories. All that remains is to prove that the epistemic relations are the same in H and
Proof of Claim
For the other direction, assume
Then, by definition of product update, h ∼ i h in Forest(M H , P H ) and e −→ i e in the appropriate event model. By the way the event model is defined, there must be some x and x with x · e ∼ i x · e in H , and therefore, by local no miracles, also h · e ∼ i h · e in H . An immediate consequence is that H and Forest(M H , P H ) are the same model.
Note that the finiteness assumption can be dropped at the expense of allowing preconditions to come from a more expressive language (specifically, infinitary epistemic logic). Alternatively, as remarked above, we can define the preconditions to be sets of histories (instead of formulas of some logical language). A possible compromise is to work with state-dependent protocols instead of uniform protocols. More precisely, in the above proof, we set the precondition of e ∈ S h j to be , and define a local DEL protocol p so that, for all w ∈ W, p(w) = {(E ) h j | h is a maximal history in H and j ≥ len(h)}. Using this observation, we can argue in the same style as above to show the following representation theorem for state-dependent DEL protocols. The above theorems identify the minimal properties that any DEL generated model must satisfy, and thus describe exactly what type of agent is presupposed in the DEL framework. The proof generalizes the one in van Benthem & Liu [15] , which is an immediate special case: let E be a fixed event model and P E be the protocol that consists of all finite sequences of repetitions of E . That is, We do not repeat the proof from [9] here since it is a specific case of our main representation theorem (Theorem 1). But there are many further DEL protocols of interest 8 and additional properties of the ETL models are needed depending on the class of DEL protocols considered. For example, let X uni PAL be the class of all uniform PAL protocols (a PAL protocol is a DEL protocol where each event model is a public announcement event model) and recall that F(X uni PAL ) = {Forest(M , P) | M an epistemic model and P a PAL protocol}.
Theorem 2 Let
P E = ({(E , e) | e ∈ D(E )}) * − {λ},
Proposition 3 (PAL-generated models) Let
H = , H, {∼ i } i∈A , V . Then H ∈ F(X uni PAL ) iff H satisfies
the minimal properties of Theorem 1, and: -for all h, h , he, h e ∈ H, if h ∼ i h , then he ∼ i h e (all events are reflexive) -for all h, h ∈ H, if he ∼ i h e , then e = e (no different events are linked).
Again, the proof will be an easy variant of Theorem 1. The details are left to the reader.
Constrained Public Announcement Logic
The representation theorems in Section 3.2 are one way of comparing and contrasting the DEL and ETL paradigms. In this Section we turn to our second objective of this paper: to illustrate some new issues that arise when DEL and ETL are merged as a model of multi-agent interactive communication and learning. To that end, we study the logics of ETL models generated by PAL protocols (DEL protocols consisting only of public announcements).
More precisely, let X PAL and X uni PAL be the set of state-dependent PAL protocols and uniform PAL protocols respectively. We will present the logics of the classes F(X PAL ) and F(X uni PAL ). These classes can be thought of as representing the space of all "conversation scenarios" or "learning procedures". We first axiomatize the class F(X PAL ), and then turn to the uniform case F(X uni PAL ) which will require us to extend our language somewhat. Recall that in the restricted setting of public announcements, we can simplify many of the definitions from Section 3.1 (see Remark 2 for a discussion).
The Logic of F(X PAL )
We work with the language L PAL (containing epistemic modalities [ i ] and announcement modalities A with A a formula of L EL ). One distinguishing feature of the current setting is that the truth of A is no longer equivalent to the availability of A for assertion. This means that the usual reduction axioms of PAL are no longer valid. Thus, the standard axiomatization of PAL does not work and we have to redo the work. We denote this new logical framework by TPAL ("temporal public announcement logic"). Definition 14 (TPAL-Axioms) Let TPAL be the smallest set of formulas of L PAL that contains the following axiom schemes.
PC. Propositional validities
K i . [ i ](ϕ → ψ) → ([ i ]ϕ → [ i ]ψ) K A . [A](ϕ → ψ) → ([A]ϕ → [A]ψ) A1. A → A R1. A P ↔ A ∧ P R2. A ¬ϕ ↔ A ∧ ¬ A ϕ R3. A [ i ]ϕ ↔ A ∧ [ i ]( A → A ϕ)
Furthermore, TPAL is closed under [ i ]-and [A]-necessitation and modus ponens. We write ϕ if ϕ ∈ TPAL.
Remark 4 (Failure of uniform substitution) Notice that TPAL does not satisfy uniform substitution. For one thing, axiom R1 only applies to atomic propositions P ∈ At. Furthermore, only formulas of L EL can be announced. So, for example, B P ↔ B ∧ P is not an instance of axiom R1. We could actually lift this restriction somewhat without endangering our results, but will not do so here.
These axioms illustrate the mixture of factual and procedural truth, which drives conversations or processes of observation. 9 In TPAL, A means that A is announceable. More precisely, A represents one temporal step in a generated ETL model Forest(M , p) for some initial model M and statedependent protocol p. So, axiom A2 represents the procedural information that "only true formulas can be announced". The converse (which is derivable in PAL) is valid only on a specific protocol following the rule "if A is true then it can be announced".
Before turning to the main result of this Section, we consider axiom R3 in more detail. Consider the following three variations of R3:
Each of these axioms represent a different assumption about the underlying protocol and how that affects the agents' knowledge. The first is the usual PAL reduction axiom and assumes a specific protocol (which is common knowledge) where all true formulas are always available for announcement. The second (weaker) axiom is valid when there is a fixed protocol that is common knowledge (cf. Section 5.2). Finally, the third is an instance of R3 which adds a requirement that the agents must know which formulas are currently available for announcement.
Our goal in this Section is to prove the following Theorem:
Theorem 3 TPAL is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of ETL models F(X PAL ).
The proof is a variant of the standard Henkin construction. 10 We construct the canonical ETL model from the set of TPAL maximal consistent sets (mcs). The main idea is that each mcs defines sequences of 'legal' public announcements which we use to define a canonical state-dependent protocol. We start by defining the set of legal histories and a function λ n that assigns maximally consistent sets to each node on a history. Definition 15 (Legal Histories) Let W 0 be the set of all TPAL maximal consistent sets. We define λ n and H n (0 ≤ n ≤ d( )) as follows:
-Set H 0 = W 0 , and for each w ∈ H 0 , λ 0 (w) = w.
We first confirm that each map λ n is well-defined.
Lemma 1 For each n
Proof The proof is by induction on n. The case n = 0 is by definition. Suppose that the statement holds for H n and λ n . Suppose σ ∈ H n+1 with σ = σ A. By the induction hypothesis, λ n (σ ) is a maximally consistent set. Furthermore, 10 The usual completeness proofs for PAL and DEL reduce the DEL expressions to standard modal logic. This device is no longer available to us here in a straightforward manner, though TPAL does allow for some 'normal form reduction'. Accordingly, the completeness proof for TPAL in this Section uses a Henkin-style model-a method also used for DEL in [24] .
by the construction of
To show that λ n+1 is consistent, assume toward contradiction that there are formulas ϕ 1 , ..., ϕ m ∈ λ n+1 (σ ) such that
A ¬ϕ ∈ λ n (σ ). And so, since λ n (σ ) is a maximally consistent set, there is some j with 1 ≤ j ≤ m and A ¬ϕ j ∈ λ n (σ ). Using axioms R2, we have ¬ A ϕ j ∈ λ n (σ ). By construction of λ n+1 (σ ) we have for each i = 1, . . . , m, A ϕ i ∈ λ n (σ ). This contradicts the fact that λ n (σ ) is consistent.
We now define a canonical ETL model H can . We start by defining
For this, we use the usual definitions:
can ) is defined as follows:
Given h ∈ H can with h = w A 1 · · · A n , we write λ(h) for λ n (h). We now show that the canonical model H can works as intended:
Proof We show by induction on the structure of ϕ ∈ L PAL that for each h ∈ H can , ϕ ∈ λ(h) iff H can , h |= ϕ. The base and the boolean cases are straightforward. For the knowledge modality, let h ∈ H can with h = w A 1 · · · A n and assume [ i ]ψ ∈ λ(h). Suppose h ∈ H can with h ∼ i h . By construction of the canonical model, we know that
. Continuing this way, we have A 2 ∈ λ(w A 1 ), . . . , A n ∈ λ(w A 1 ...A n−1 ).
Now note that
A 1 ∈ λ(w),
Thus, we have
. . . For the public announcement operator, assume that By the induction hypothesis, we have ψ ∈ λ(hA) and thus A ψ ∈ λ(h).
Since λ(h) is a maximally consistent set, we have ¬[ i ]ψ ∈ λ(h). Thus, by Definition 15, A ¬[ i ]ψ ∈ λ(w). Using axiom R2, ¬ A [ i ]ψ ∈ λ(w); and so, by Axiom
R3, ¬ A ∨ ¬[ i ]( A → A ψ) ∈ λ(w). Since A ∈ λ(w) by construction, it follows that ¬[ i ]( A → A ψ) ∈ λ(w). Now consider the set v 0 = {θ | [ i ]θ ∈ λ(w)} ∪ {¬( A → A ψ)}.A ψ ∈ λ(h). Since A ∈ λ(h) (for ¬ A ∈ λ(h) makes λ(h) inconsistent), ψ ∈ λ(hA
All that remains is to show that canonical model H
can is in the class of intended models: i.e., it is an element of F(X PAL ).
Lemma 3 H can is in F(X PAL ). That is, there is an epistemic model M and statedependent protocol p on
The proof of the completeness theorem (Theorem 3) follows from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 using a standard argument. The details are left to the reader.
Exploring TPAL Further
Completeness for TPAL is just the beginning of exploring its logical properties. In this Section, we briefly consider a few more, referring to the extended on-line version of this paper [13] and the forthcoming dissertation by Tomohiro Hoshi [30] for details.
Decidability
As is the case for public announcement logic, the satisfiability problem for TPAL is decidable. As usual, we can show this by constructing a finite model for a given satisfiable formula ϕ, but the precise implementation takes some care. We state a few highlights without proof.
First of all, formulas ϕ ∈ L PAL can describe, at most, what is true after a sequence of announcements bounded in length by the depth of ϕ.
Definition 17 (Depth of a Formula) Suppose ϕ ∈ L PAL . The depth of ϕ, denoted d(ϕ), is defined as follows:
This definition is lifted to a set X ⊆ L PAL as follows:
Given a protocol p on M and a sequence σ ∈ (L EL ) * with σ ∈ p(w) for some w ∈ D(M ), we define a protocol p
. This family represents which sequences of formulas of length k or less are announcable after σ .
Observation 1 Let
Next, the histories relevant to evaluate a given formula ϕ ∈ L PAL are the ones that contain its subformulas. Let sub a (ϕ) be the set of subformulas of ϕ that are in L EL . Given a state-dependent protocol p on a model M , for
These are the admissible ϕ-restricted announcement sequences at w.
Finally we state the analogue of Proposition 1. Given a formula ϕ ∈ L PAL and an epistemic model
One can now follow the completeness proof from Section 4.1 and construct a canonical model from a finite set of formulas satisfying some closure conditions whose combinatorial details we omit here. The eventual result is the following two finitized correctness statements (the superscript f in in the statements below signifies that the object is finite): Lemma 4 (Finite Truth Lemma) Let be a finite set of formulas satisfying certain closure conditions (cf. [13] ) and ϕ ∈ . For all h ∈ H f in such that
Lemma 5 H f in is an ETL model generated from an epistemic model and a PAL protocol.
Putting everything together in the usual manner, we have that:
Theorem 4 (Decidability of TPAL) The satisfiability problem for TPAL is decidable.
What this analysis does not supply is the precise computational complexity of TPAL, which remains an open problem. For PAL, the complexity of satisfiability is Pspace-complete, but we do not know if the reduction technique of [33] for that result lifts to our setting.
The Logic of F(X
Next consider the issue of special models on top of our general semantics, in particular, the move from state-dependent to uniform protocols. Formally, let H be an ETL model generated by an epistemic model M = W, {R i } i∈A , V and a (state-dependent or uniform) PAL protocol. Let w ∈ W and σ be a sequence of announcements with wσ ∈ D(H ). We interpret an additional existential modality Eϕ as accessibility at the same tree level:
This operator functions as an existential modality at each 'stage' of successive public announcements. The dual U is a universal modality in the same sense. We denote the extension of L PAL with the existential modality
EL is the language extending L EL with the existential modality E).
Moving to a larger language gives us more formulas to announce: the definitions of a PAL event model and PAL (state-dependent) protocols should be amended to allow formulas of L E EL to be announced. In this new setting, we extend the logic TPAL with the following set of axioms:
We also include U-necessitation. The resulting logic will be denoted by TPAL E . Axioms E1-5 are the standard axiomatization of the existential modality (cf. [18, pg. 417 
]). It is not hard to see that TPAL
E is a conservative extension of TPAL and that analogues of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 can be proven. However, we are interested in axiomatizing the following class of ETL models:
For this, we add the following axiom to TPAL E :
This formula characterizes uniform protocols in the following sense. Say a state-dependent protocol p on an epistemic model M generates a uniform ETL model if Forest(M , p) = Forest(M , P) for some uniform PAL protocol P. We first make a simple observation:
Proposition 4 The axiom Uni is valid on a frame of Forest(M , p) iff p generates a uniform ETL model.

Proof (⇐) Assume that p generates a uniform ETL model
H = Forest(M , p). Then there is some uniform protocol P such that H = Forest(M , P). Now suppose that w ∈ D(M ) and σ ∈ (L E EL ) * . Assume that H , wσ |= A . Then,
we have wσ A ∈ D(H ). This means that σ A ∈ p(w).
Since p is uniform, there is some PAL protocol P such that H = Forest(M , P). Therefore σ A ∈ P. Now, let v be an arbitrary state in
Clearly, P is closed under prefixes, so it is a PAL protocol. We need to show that H p = Forest(M , P). For this, it suffices that, for all σ , M σ, p = M σ,P , equivalently (via Definition 9 and Remark 2) W σ, p = W σ,P . The left-to-right inclusion is clear by the construction of P. For the converse, we use induction on the length of σ . For the base case, σ is the empty sequence; and so, the inclusion clearly 11 We remark that an analogous result is true in the more general setting of arbitrary DEL protocols-truth of epistemic formulas only depends on the model at the "current level". Proof The proof is similar to the one outlined in Section 4.1, where Proposition 4 shows that the canonical model is generated by a uniform protocol.
Embedding PAL in TPAL
Finally, here is a perhaps surprising issue. The relation between the original public announcement logic (PAL, cf. [24, 38] ) and our new TPAL is not completely straightforward. Clearly, all principles of TPAL are valid in PAL. Indeed, the inclusion seems proper, as standard public announcement logic is about special "full" protocols. But is it really stronger than TPAL? Using the existential modality of the previous Section, we can answer this question almost in the negative by providing an effective semantic translation from PAL into TPAL E : We write |= PAL E ϕ if ϕ is valid on all epistemic models M where truth is defined as in Definition 5 (all event models are public announcements) and the existential modality is interpreted as above. We write |= T PAL E ϕ if ϕ is valid on all models of the form Forest(M , p) where p is a state-dependent protocol (and the existential modality is defined as above). Given a formula ϕ ∈ L E PAL , let Ptcl(ϕ) be the set of formulas of the form:
The formulas in Ptcl(ϕ) state that the public announcements relevant to the truth value of ϕ are all announceable at any node of a given ETL-model.
Theorem 5 For any formula
Proof The proof revolves around the following result (cf. Observation 3): We do not know if we can do this reduction without the existential modalitiy. Also, we have not solved the opposite question, whether TPAL can be faithfully embedded into PAL, though we think the answer is negative.
A Glimpse of Broader Issues
Epistemic temporal logic and dynamic epistemic logic are two important but interestingly different ways of describing knowledge-based agent interaction over time. We have shown how the two can be linked in two ways: using structural representation theorems (cf. Theorem 1 and related results in Section 3.2) and new sorts of axiomatic completeness theorems for epistemic temporal model classes generated by DEL protocols (cf. Theorem 3 and other results in Section 4). Our results suggest a more systematic 'logic of protocols' using ideas from DEL to add fine-structure to ETL. In this final Section, we sketch some general issues suggested by this perspective, referring again to [13] and [30] for details.
More specifically, using the construction discussed in Section 3.1, each set of DEL protocols induces a class of ETL models: those generated by an initial model and a protocol from the given set. Recall that if X is a set of DEL protocols, we define F(X) = {Forest(M , P) | M an epistemic model and P ∈ X}. This construction suggests the following natural questions:
-Which DEL protocols generate interesting ETL models? -Which modal languages are most suitable to describe these models? -Can we axiomatize interesting classes of DEL-generated ETL models?
For some combinations of model classes and languages we already know answers. For example, recall that ProtocolDEL is the set of all finite sequences of DEL event models. Then
is the set consisting of all DEL generated ETL models. Its logic (with respect to the language L DEL ) can be axiomatized using the well-known reduction axioms: indeed this is the standard completeness theorem for DEL [5] .
Language Extensions
L ETL is only one of many languages for reasoning about DEL generated ETL models, and there are many other temporal and epistemic operators of interest. Typical examples include a common knowledge operator Cϕ and a "backwards-looking" operator e − ϕ meaning that ϕ was true before event e happened (and e happened just before). Another obvious extension is with temporal operators of the form Fϕ: "ϕ is true some time in the future" or e * ϕ: "ϕ is true after a finite sequence of e events" expressing the temporal future of the current process.
Group Knowledge Operators Several notions of group knowledge are relevant to our representation results, as well as understanding protocols-and we have not analyzed what these do in the setting of our logic TPAL. Let H = , H, {∼ i } i∈A , V be an ETL model with ∼ * the reflexive transitive closure of the relation i∈A ∼ i . Common knowledge of ϕ (denoted Cϕ) is defined as follows:
van Benthem et al. [12] discuss the technical issues that arise when axiomatizing Public Announcement Logic in languages with common knowledge. They introduce a new "relativized common knowledge" operator C(ψ|ϕ) saying that all ψ-paths end in a states satisfying ϕ. More formally, with [[ϕ[] the set of histories satisfying ϕ, and X + is the transitive closure of any set X:
The usual common knowledge operator Cϕ can be defined as C( |ϕ). van Benthem et al. axiomatizes public announcement logic with this additional operator, and shows how similar ideas work for DEL as a whole [12] . We conjecture that the class F(X PAL ) can be axiomatized by adding the following axiom to TPAL:
Another important notion of group knowledge is distributed knowledge (denoted Dϕ), defined using an intersection of accessibilities:
This notion is not bisimulation invariant, and complexity of validity tends to go up. Still, distributed knowledge is essential to understanding what a group comes to know if agents publicly share everything they currently know. We will need an extension of L ETL with distributed knowledge on communication protocols (cf. Section 6.3). For now, we conjecture that TPAL plus the usual rules for the modal operator D and the following axiom scheme:
is sound and complete for the class F(X PAL ), where Dϕ is ¬D¬ϕ.
Temporal Operators
To understand where we find ourselves with this paper, we can profit from existing work on languages for reasoning about arbitrary ETL models, not just those generated by DEL protocols. Key results of Halpern and Vardi show that both imposing agent idealizations (such as Perfect Recall or No Miracles) and language extensions (arbitrary future plus common knowledge) lead to high undecidability results [27] . van Benthem and Pacuit [17] provide an overview of these results and related ones from other areas of computer science. We summarize a few essential notions and results.
Let H = , H, {∼ i } i∈A , V is an ETL model, where h ∈ H. If e ∈ and n a natural number, then e n is the sequence of ee · · · e of length n. We define:
-H , h |= Fϕ iff there exists h ∈ H, h h and H , h |= ϕ.
-H , h |= e * ϕ iff there is an h ∈ H with h = he n for some n and H , h |= ϕ -H , h |= Nϕ iff there is an h ∈ H with h = he for some e ∈ and H , h |= ϕ
We write Gϕ for ¬F¬ϕ (i.e., Gϕ means ϕ is true in all future extensions). Much work in this area has already been done, including logics with a nexttime operator N or a Kleene star on events e * . Let ProtocolPAL be the set of all finite sequences of public announcement event models (i.e., the full tree of all possible sequences of PAL event models). Similarly, let ProtocolDEL be the set of all finite sequences of event models. The usual axiomatization of public announcement logic works for the class F({ProtocolPAL}) Similarly, the standard axiomatization of DEL [5, 12] 
is valid on H , where Cϕ is ¬C¬ϕ..
Logics of Specific Protocols
Now that we have the general correspondence and axiomatization results of this paper, one next area of investigation should be the more detailed study of specific types of protocol, and the logical validities which they induce. We want to put our languages to use in bringing out special structures of reasoning. What follows are just two samples of such a logical protocol theory, to show its viability. These come from [23] , which studies simple conversational-style restrictions, and [9] on algorithms for 'maximal communication' eventually turning distributed knowledge into common knowledge.
13
Honest communication and the communicative core A minimal requirement for an "honest" public announcement of ϕ is that the speaker believes what he announces. This can be represented as a public announcement with a precondition ϕ ∧ [i]ϕ for some i ∈ A . The matching protocol ProtocolHonest uses all and only public announcements with preconditions of this form. "Runs" of this protocol satisfy a "safety property": all information announced is already known by one of the agents, and hence the knowledge present in the whole system should neither increase nor decrease. What such runs achieve is increasing the shared group knowledge of such facts (modulo some complications having to do with epistemic non-factual assertions).
To make this precise, we represent "the knowledge present in a system" as the following variant of the earlier distributed group knowledge. Let M = W, {R i } i∈A , V be an epistemic model with the R i all equivalence relations, and w ∈ W. The "communicative core" at w is the submodel M | I w of M whose states are only those worlds w with w R i w for each agent i. Here is a corresponding modal operator:
Gerbrandy [23] provides a complete axiomatization for L EL this operator. Here is our first epistemic-temporal validity expressing a significant property of protocols:
Proposition 5 For all M in which all R i are equivalence relations, and each ϕ that is purely epistemic (that is, it has no temporal operators):
This leaves open the issue whether agents can actually reach the communicative core by communicating. van Benthem [9] shows how, in finite models with two agents, the communicative core can be reached by the agents telling 'all they know', though 'bisimulation contractions' may be needed along the way. But [25] shows how this may break down with more than two agents. Intuitively, the following principle should be valid, with 'F' a future operator:
But given what we just said, the precise set of protocols supporting this conversion from distributed into common knowledge remains to be determined.
Communication over an insecure channel More realistic interactive protocols involve partial observation by agents, and insecure channels of communication. This needs the full apparatus of DEL rather than PAL, to which our approach can be lifted [30] . DEL protocols formalize well-known phenomena (cf. [9, 36] ) such as the classic "coordinated attack" problem [22] where messages are not guaranteed to arrive.
Sending a message ϕ that need not arrive can be represented by a DEL event model with three events: e 1 where the message was sent and received, e 2 where the message was sent but not received, and e 3 in which no message was sent at all. Events e 1 and e 2 have as their precondition that the message ϕ that was sent is believed to be true by the sender, i.e. [s]ϕ; while e 3 has just a trivial precondition . The sender of the message cannot distinguish e 1 and e 2 , the receiver cannot distinguish e 2 from e 3 (even if she knows no message arrived, for her, this may mean that no message was sent in the first place, or it got lost on the way): Now, let ProtocolInsecure be the DEL protocol that contains all and only sequences of this type of message. This time, we get conclusions opposite to our previous setting: agents may learn new facts, but common knowledge will never grow! For all propositional formulas, or, more generally, any formula ϕ in which knowledge operators only occur under an even number of negations, either ϕ is common knowledge throughout each run of the protocol, or it never is, was or will be. However, common knowledge may 'change'. Even with no message sent at all, it becomes common knowledge that the message ϕ might have been sent. Here is the logical fact behind these observations:
Proposition 6
In all models M where the accessibility relations are equivalence relations, the following holds for all formulas ϕ in which epistemic operators occur only positively:
This differs from a celebrated result by [22] that common knowledge cannot change when communication is not reliable. The latter result depends on the assumption that the system is asynchronous-agents that do not receive a message also do not know that a message might have been sent.
Conclusion
We have shown how DEL and ETL as major approaches to modeling interacting agents over time complement each other: both in the way that models are constructed ("globally" in the ETL approach, "locally" from an initial model in the DEL approach), and in the kind of models constructed. As we have seen, the ETL models generated by DEL protocols are a proper subclass of the full set-for example, asynchronous systems cannot be described by DEL updates. On the other hand, in the model constructions in [22] and [37] , the assumption that epistemic relations are equivalence relations is more or less built in, while DEL also handles cases where information may be false. But our major conclusion has been that the approaches are similar enough to admit significant merges, as in our TPAL-based theory of protocols.
Our framework raises many new open problems. We mention issues of: For example, what is the complete logic of "honest announcements" F(ProtocolHonest)? 14 A number of recent papers has raised similar issues (see, for example, Baltag [3] and van Eijck and Wang [21] ). 6 . From Knowledge to Belief: How to extend the analysis in this paper to doxastic logic and agents' changing beliefs over time, using doxastictemporal logics and recent versions of DEL for belief change [10] to deal with protocols? 15 7. Learning Theory: Connect our logic of protocols with learning theory [31] . 8. Process Theories: A broader challenge is using DEL, with its explicit account of model construction inside the logic, as an intermediate between ETL-style frameworks which describe properties of states and histories inside given models, and paradigms like process algebra or game semantics, with their explicit construction of dynamic processes.
In summary, we hope to have shown that interfacing DEL and ETL, as major views of informative processes, is significant, productive, and well-worth exploring further. 14 We conjecture that the logic of F(ProtocolHonest) (in the language L PAL ) is TPAL with the axioms !ϕ ∧ [i]ϕ for all formulas ϕ, plus axioms of the form ¬ ψ for all formulas ψ that are not of the form ϕ ∧ [i]ϕ. 15 An analogue of our main representation theorem in terms of 'Priority Update' of plausibility models and modal correspondence results for doxastic temporal models has just been given in [11] .
